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RECOVERING LOST LIVES: RESEARCHING WOMEN IN LEGAL HISTORY 
Rosemary Auchmuty 
Abstract 
Drawing on the research I undertook into the life of Gwyneth Bebb, who in 1913 
challenged the Law Society of England and Wales for their refusal to admit women to 
the solicitors’ profession, this article focuses on the range of sources one might use to 
explore the lives of women in law, about whom there might be a few public records but 
little else, and on the ways in which sources, even official ones, might be imaginatively 
used. It traces the research process from the case that inspired the research (Bebb v The 
Law Society [1914] 1 Ch 286) through to the creation of an entry in the Oxford Dictionary of 
National Biography and what this means for women’s history, emphasising the importance 
of asking the ‘woman question’ and seeking out the broader significance of a woman’s 
life in the context of her times.   
 
There are very few biographies of legal women in the UK.  This is partly because very few 
such women have been considered important enough to merit the conventional type of 
study, based on their contribution to public life, but also because women’s legal history 
has also not, until recently, been considered important enough for academic study.  
Paradoxically, what this really meant was that it was too important, for to reveal 
women’s legal history too clearly would be to uncover the many mechanisms by which 
men have retained power for themselves in law and to give the lie to the vaunted 
equality of opportunity for men and women.  Today, fortunately, no scholar need 
apologise for focusing on women; the problem is, rather, the paucity of information 
about those legal pioneers, for whom records have not been kept precisely because their 
lives were deemed unimportant.  This means we have to be imaginative in our search 
not only for source material but actually for women subjects to research, and to ask 
different questions of the public records that do survive and have been written up in the 
past.   
As Karen Tani puts it, the task of historical scholarship is  
to continually assess and re-assess significance; to take existing categories and 
orderings and reconstruct them, so that raw data, new and old, becomes 
meaningful to today’s consumers.  It is especially the task of historians of women, 
since their data is so often cast into the ‘unimportant’ bin.1 
 
Painstaking research by Patrick Polden,2 Anne Logan,3 Hector MacQueen4 and others has 
uncovered the names of many of the ‘firsts’ among English and Scottish legal women 
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but, as they found, naming them is just the start; in trying to reconstruct what it was 
like to be one of these pioneers, and to fill in the context of their lives, not simply the 
public struggles and achievements but also, if possible, the private ones - the source 
problem is magnified a hundredfold, for personal records are so rarely kept.  Even sizable 
archives like that of Helena Normanton (early woman barrister and contemporary of 
Miss Bebb) contain no personal papers.5  Mary Jane Mossman’s The First Women Lawyers6, 
which compares the experiences of early women lawyers in the United States, Canada, 
England, New Zealand, India and some continental jurisdictions, benefited from a 
reasonably wide range of public sources, while for her North American case studies she 
was assisted by an increasing body of doctoral dissertations on early women lawyers.  
Nevertheless the amount of effort in recovering these stories was prodigious and she had 
to ask different questions from the usual ‘tale of progress’ to reach the uncomfortable 
conclusion that admission to the legal profession was the start, rather than the end, of 
women’s struggle for quality.  
 For what I actually found out about Miss Bebb, I refer readers to the substantive 
article in Legal Studies.7  In brief, she studied law at Oxford, worked for some years in 
government service, brought the test case against the Law Society, married and had a 
child, all the while playing an active role in a well-organised, persistent and very public 
campaign (about which the institutional histories are totally silent) for the admission of 
women to the legal profession, eventually won in 1919.  But she died before she could be 
called to the Bar8 and this accounted for her disappearance from history.   
 The present article focuses on the method and process of undertaking a biography 
of this type when the sources are elusive or absent, as is so often the case with women.  
It begins with a consideration of case law as a historical source, since my own research 
started thus. While legal scholars are uniquely qualified to understand the legal 
reasoning behind a judgment (something often misunderstood or ignored by non-legally-
trained historians), they are apt to forget that judgments are products of their time, as 
susceptible of historical analysis as any other primary source (Who is speaking? For what 
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purpose? Who is the audience? What is the context?). The article then considers how the 
biographer might move from the case to other, sometimes unexpected, sources, and how 
these sources can – indeed, must – be creatively used in order to elicit information not 
always apparent on their face, or able to be extrapolated or conjectured across to one’s 
subject.  It concludes with an assessment of the significance of this kind of biographical 
study, which extends above and beyond the telling of an individual life. 
Starting from the case 
My research was inspired by a case: Bebb v the Law Society [1914] 1 Ch 286.  It is sometimes 
mentioned in history books but with little detail or context.  The Court of Appeal 
decision is easy enough to find; it was reported in both the Law Reports and the Times 
Law Reports.  Characteristically for the time, the reports are is quite short, though 
Counsels’ main arguments are included and all three justices pronounced.  The summary 
of facts tells us nothing about the plaintiff except that she was a ‘spinster’, a description 
repeated faithfully by my students, with all its misleading connotations – Miss Bebb was 
23 years old at the time – and, less forgivably, by Manchester in his Modern Legal History.9  
The Master of the Rolls mentions in his judgment that Miss Bebb was ‘a distinguished 
Oxford student’ (a clue to the biographer) ‘ – and at least equal to a great many, and 
probably, far better than many, of the candidates who will come up for examination,10 
but,’ he adds, ‘that is really not for us to consider.  Our duty is to consider and, so far as 
we can, to ascertain what the law is, and I disclaim absolutely any right to legislate in a 
matter of this kind’.11  In that disclaimer, of course, lies the reasoning behind the 
outcome.  His fellow-judges agreed: ‘We are not here to say what should be the law,’ 
Phillimore LJ states.  ‘ … Our function is to declare the law’.12  Neither he nor Swinfen-
Eady LJ says anything about Miss Bebb. 
 The era before the first world war is widely-regarded as a conservative one for 
judicial law-making.13 J.A.G. Griffith, however, argued forcefully that judges in all periods 
have demonstrated judicial creativity when they wanted to and, further, that the notion 
of judicial neutrality is a myth.14  Certainly the spirited arguments of Miss Bebb’s 
Counsel, Lord Robert Cecil KC, suggest that a different outcome was not inconceivable.  
He drew on precedents of women in public life, persuasive practice in other common-
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law jurisdictions, and the wording of the statute under consideration – section 2 of the 
Solicitors Act 1843, which mentioned ‘persons’, and section 48, which said that words 
importing the masculine gender were to be taken as applying also to women.  In her 
comparative study, Mary Jane Mossman notes that the same precedents were used by 
judges in other common-law jurisdictions to justify opening the profession to women.15   
The fact that a woman was willing to challenge the law in England, and the fact that 
leave to appeal was granted, indicate that there was some will for change.  People do not 
present themselves as test cases out of the blue.  They nearly always represent a wider 
constituency, one that enjoys a measure of support and probably organisation.  In 1912, 
first-wave feminism was at its zenith, with a strong and active suffrage movement and 
votes for women seemingly just around the corner.  I was keen to discover more about 
Miss Bebb and her associates and how she fitted into all this. 
Biography in judgments 
I am not the first person (it goes without saying) to want to find out more about the story 
behind a case.  Brian Simpson famously explained how, confronted by the very first case 
he read as a law student (R v Dudley and Stephens [1884] 14 QBD 273), his curiosity about 
the context stood in the way of his comprehension of the legal principle.  Questions 
piled up in his mind: 
Who were these men? What on earth were they doing in the South Atlantic in a 
yacht? Why did it founder? Why did they not keep quiet about the whole affair, 
given the fact that the principal evidence against them had been consumed? Why 
just six months’ imprisonment? What became of them afterwards? Only, it seemed 
to me, by answering these questions could this weird case be undertood (my emphasis).16 
 
He noted, however, that this reaction – almost instinctive for a legal historian – was at 
odds with the prevailing legal pedagogy.  Richard Ireland confirms:  
As lawyers, we often lose the people behind the law, the circumstances and 
personalities in the intensely personal dramas which eventually lead to the 
headnotes of our authorities.  The more personal and contextual details, as 
Simpson reminds us, we are taught to consider as legally irrelevant.17 
 
Law teachers who practise a socio-legal approach are torn.  On the one hand, we try to 
wean our students away from the superfluous re-telling of facts every time they apply an 
authority to a problem.  On the other, we want them to be able to situate case law in its 
social and political context, if only to show how cases may be distinguished and the law 
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developed.  What matters, of course, is which facts are emphasised, and what is done with 
them.18  A further problem is that many of the facts a biographer or historian might be 
interested in are not, in fact, those highlighted (or even mentioned) in the case report.19 
The suppression of superfluous or ‘irrelevant’ facts in the study of case law arises 
from the attempt, which began towards the end of the nineteenth century with the 
production of the first law textbooks, to impose a form of scientific logic on the 
development of the common law.  Legal reasoning became a process of finding (and, in 
some cases, writing back into past decisions) an evolving legal principle, while paring 
down the facts of cases to the bare distinguishable (or not) elements.  It is easy to see 
why this happened: more and more cases were being decided, law reports were 
correspondingly more voluminous and comprehensive, legal education was expanding 
and legal academics were trying to establish law as a subject for university study rather 
than simply a practical apprenticeship.  The whole tenor of Victorian life was, in any 
case, conducive to the scientific approach.  There is no denying that the appearance of 
textbooks greatly facilitated students’ learning of law but the effect was to over-simplify, 
confuse and, at times, obliterate the historical context which had contributed to legal 
decisions and developments.  When we look at some of the textbooks on the market 
today we can see this process of reducing law to an exact science raised to the highest 
and most regrettable level. 
That said, the omission of ‘irrelevant’ facts was not simply a textbook technique, 
it was also characteristic of the judgments of the time.  The Court of Appeal judgments 
in Bebb illustrate this tendency.  While facts have played a greater or lesser role in legal 
decision-making at different periods and at the hands of different judges, it is clear that 
the more scientific the court’s approach (that is, the more the judge simply applies the 
‘relevant’ principle), the fewer facts will be revealed and the less we will be told about 
the particular circumstances of the litigants. 
There are two reasons for this.  First, giving details of the claimants’ lives and 
situation is likely to engender empathy, if not sympathy, making an unfavourable 
verdict harder to deliver and justify.  No wonder then that judges might avoid the 
uncomfortable detail.  Second, information of this sort often serves to highlight the gap 
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between the assumptions behind the principle relied upon and the reality on the 
ground, and thus to raise doubts as to the suitability or justice of the principle itself.  In 
Miss Bebb’s case, for instance, the principle which caused her challenge to fail was the 
one that said that women had always been barred from public office.  Yet Miss Bebb in 
the very year the case was heard, in 1913, was working (as I subsequently discovered) as 
an Investigating Officer for the Board of Trade, in which role she brought prosecutions 
against employers in the sweated trades.  In other words, she was employed in the public 
sector doing exactly what a qualified solicitor would do.  This went unmentioned in the 
judgment, lest the outcome be too clearly revealed as senseless and contradictory. 
 By way of comparison, let us briefly consider the use made of biography and 
context by that master of legal narrative, Lord Denning.  Denning was a great judge 
partly because his knowledge of the law was so extensive he could conjure up a 
precedent for every result he wished to reach, but partly for his ability – and willingness 
– to advance the law in situations where he believed this would procure justice.  His 
technique of starting his judgments by situating the parties and their actions in the 
context of their place and time marked a break from the earlier practice of ignoring 
biography and context, and it enabled Denning to do precisely what the judges in Bebb 
could not and would not do: to develop the law by (a) engaging sympathy for the 
unjustly-treated claimant (Denning by his own account single-handedly revived the 
equitable jurisdiction)20 and (b) exposing the contradiction between a legal principle 
based on a particular conception of society and the reality of people’s social 
circumstances at that moment in time.  This helps to explain why Denning contributed 
so significantly to the development of rights for women in the 1960s and 1970s, because 
women’s situation changed so profoundly across the twentieth century, beginning with 
the advances of the first-wave feminist movement of which Miss Bebb was part, and 
continuing with those of second-wave feminism which precipitated so many women into 
the courts during Denning’s time as Master of the Rolls.   
 Here is one example, offered simply to show how, in different times and with 
different judges, Miss Bebb’s case could have been decided differently.  In Williams & 
Glyn’s Bank v Boland (1978) 36 P & CR 448 (Ch D), Templeman J found the idea that Mrs 
Boland might have an overriding interest against the bank impossible in law and 
impracticable in practice (it would have ‘almost catastrophic effects,’ he warned).21  Lord 
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Denning in the Court of Appeal, however, deftly disposed of these objections by 
exposing, while never actually saying so, the fact that Templeman’s real objection was to 
the idea that women might have separate interests in the home from their legal-owner 
husband’s.  Such a notion was inconceivable to judges comfortable with the traditional 
image of breadwinner husband and dependent wife that had dominated British society 
up to the 1950s. 
Noting the finding by both Stamp J in Caunce v Caunce22 and Templeman J in Boland 
that lenders cannot be said to have notice of occupying wives, Denning says:  
I profoundly disagree.  Such statements would have been true a hundred years 
ago when the law regarded husband and wife as one; and the husband as that 
one.  But they are not true today.23 
 
And of course they were not.  Mrs Boland, as Denning explained at the outset, was a 
nurse, married for 20 years to a builder.  Both husband and wife worked (they had only 
one child) and both had contributed to the purchase of the home in dispute, as well as to 
a previous one.  Denning sets out these facts at the very start (Templeman tells us 
absolutely nothing about Mrs Boland except that she is Mr Boland’s wife) so that later he 
can reach a radical new understanding of the law by demonstrating that the denial of 
rights to women in her situation is contrived, out of step with modern circumstances 
(not to speak of common sense) and, indeed, unfair.  
 Let us now consider one more aspect of Denning’s judgment technique, which 
demonstrates more than that of any other judge except, perhaps, Lady Hale, how 
biography and context can work for women litigants.  Just as he generalises from the 
individual litigant to women as a group, so Denning sometimes uses the reverse 
technique, starting from the general and ascribing this to the particular.  While this is 
obviously very effective as a rhetorical device, it also enabled him to fill in gaps in the 
facts – the very technique I was to use when trying to fill in the gaps in Miss Bebb’s life.  
Templeman J, for example, observed in the lower court that Mrs Boland could have 
protected herself by entering a spouse’s right of occupation (referred to as a Class F 
charge) on the Land Register.  Lord Denning, not knowing precisely why Mrs Boland had 
not done so (but a clue may lie in the fact that this right only became available to wives 
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with a beneficial interest in the property after the property in dispute had been 
purchased),24 instead generalised as to how women like her would have behaved: 
But that amendment was of precious little use to her, at any rate when she was 
living at home in peace with her husband.  She would never have heard of a Class F 
charge: and she would not have understood it if she had.25 
 
This is patronising, perhaps, but effective and, what is more important, probably true – 
and it is also, of course, the reason why overriding interests were introduced into the 
Land Registration Act 1925 in the first place: to protect those who would not think of 
registering their right.  But the point I wish to make in this article is that sometimes, in 
trying to construct a life of someone for whom few records are available, the biographer 
may have to conjecture from the general to the particular.   
Getting behind the case 
Once you begin to ask intelligent questions about cases, questions directed to 
understanding the case as a historical event, it is fairly obvious that you have to 
seek for answers in sources other than law reports …26 
 
I wanted to find out more about Miss Bebb – her family background, her Oxford 
experience, her role in the trial and her later life.  So - where to start?  The obvious place 
would be the Register of Births, Deaths and Marriages at St Catherine’s House, and to 
follow up with visits to the archives of her Oxford college, the Law Society, and her Inn 
of Court.  But the truth is that, these days, we tend to go first to the internet, and this is 
what I did. Websites provide a valuable forum for genealogists, local history societies, 
independent researchers and bloggers to publicise their work, in addition to leading us 
to published books, articles and archives.  But they need to be treated with caution.  The 
same ideas, the same stories get repeated endlessly and we can easily fall into the trap of 
seeing this as corroboration.  Often it is not; it’s the just the same, possibly mistaken, 
source being repeated again and again – as I found.  The story of Miss Bebb’s legal 
challenge to the Law Society has been re-told so often that I thought, writing my article, 
that I could skim over this bit - that a brief summary of what happened would do.  In 
fact, although I called it ‘a brief summary’, the account ran to two pages because what 
was in the public domain seemed to me so misleading.  This meant that, before I even 
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embarked on finding out about my subject’s life beyond her legal action (my initial goal), 
I had to check the facts of the case itself and revise existing accounts of the campaign 
that led to it.  Even the public records had been misrepresented, and that was before I 
even got to the private ones! 
 This brings us to the second consideration of the legal biographer, which is 
equally crucial.  Without sources, you can’t really say much that is authoritative about 
your subject; but, even with them, you won’t produce anything worthwhile unless you 
ask the right questions of your sources.  Many short biographical studies – articles, say, like 
the one I was writing – present the known facts of the subject’s life but fail to consider 
the questions that might immediately occur to the reader.  Questions like, What was it 
like to be in that situation?  How would that event have affected that person?  In the 
absence of any direct reference, many scholars are loathe to ‘speculate’ (as they see it); 
and critics can be scathing about assertions like ‘she must have …’ or ‘she would have 
…’ (a criticism which incidentally never bothered Lord Denning).  
 So we have two problems: our ‘facts’ are not always true, as published accounts 
may be wrong, and our conjectures may not be founded in ‘fact’ – so we end up with 
maybe two sentences: birth, death, and a few achievements in between that can be 
conclusively ‘proved’ to have happened. 
 How biographers deal with these two considerations depends fundamentally on 
what their aims are in tackling this particular life.  It is why one account can differ so 
greatly from another; it is why history is often described as a ‘dialogue between the past 
and the present’; and it is why we train research students to come up with a research 
question.  What do you want to find out?  What is the issue for you?  It isn’t ‘all I know 
about X’ for a biography any more than it is for an answer to an exam or coursework 
question. 
In my case, the research question was the title of my article: ‘Whatever happened 
to Miss Bebb?’  If you read any history of the English legal professions, she will probably 
rate a mention – or her case will – but that will be it.  One mention; then she’s gone.  
Now women get little enough attention in institutional histories, but Helena Normanton, 
Ivy Williams, other feminist pioneers – we can construct lives for them from other 
available sources.27  Miss Bebb, however, was just a case name.  I didn’t even know her 
first name when I started; she didn’t appear in the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography or 
Who’s Who.  But even once I discovered this, and something about her background and 
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education, I still could not understand why more was not heard of her subsequently.  So I 
set myself the task of finding out. 
Asking questions that matter 
I do think that telling the story of any human being’s life is worth doing, especially a 
woman’s, since women have been (as Sheila Rowbotham put it in her pioneering book 
more than 40 years ago) Hidden from History28 for so long.  But a life on its own is not 
always interesting per se; sometimes I read an account and think (I am sorry to say), So 
what?  Individual life accounts are useful source material for social historians who can 
aggregate experiences and make generalisations or offer them as examples, but they are 
not necessarily fascinating on their own. 
 After some research, I was able to establish why Miss Bebb disappeared from legal 
history.  She married, so she changed her name; then she died before she had qualified 
as a lawyer, so she dropped out of the story altogether.  So I answered my question. 
 But was this enough? No – the ‘So what?’ question remained.  But by then I knew 
enough about her life to be able to make a bigger argument about women’s place in 
history generally.  Once I found out that she had died in childbirth, I recognised that, 
unlike most other pioneer professional women who had been able to pursue their 
careers largely because they did not marry (like Ivy Williams) or did not have children 
(like Helena Normanton), the fact that  Miss Bebb had wanted both a career and a family 
was actually her undoing.  The penalty she paid for this choice, which men did not have 
to make, was not simply a professional but a biological one.  She died because women, 
unlike men, bear babies, and because maternal health care was not a high priority in 
early twentieth-century Britain.  Mothers suffered, mothers died; maternal maternity, 
though sad, was routine.  In this sense, then, Miss Bebb stood for a much larger group of 
women, because what happened to her happened because she was a woman.  Indeed, 
everything in her life was different because she was a woman.  Different from what?  From 
the normal human story – the usual history of the professions or public life: the story of 
the male experience, a world in which women were excluded or treated differently, and 
into which we were eventually subsumed, as if nothing had happened.   
 So one of the questions any historian or biographer must ask (whether 
researching a male or female figure) is the woman question.  You must ask, does this 
statement, law or situation apply to both sexes or only to men?  If to both, how would 
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their experiences of the same phenomenon be different?  If only to men, where are the 
women?  What was happening to them? 
 Miss Bebb, for example, was among the second generation of women who were 
admitted to Oxford.  In theory, she could have had the same education as men; she 
certainly had the same teachers and sat the same exams.  But of course her experience of 
Oxford was totally different from the men’s.  She lived in a small, poor women’s college 
(which was nevertheless an intensely stimulating environment for a girl at the time).  
She got her first, but could not be awarded a degree.  She studied law, but could not 
become a lawyer.  We are fortunate that the editorial policy of the multi-volume History 
of the University of Oxford has been to include women at every point; this is one secondary 
source that responded to feminist critics, and I found it invaluable for details of degree 
courses, personnel and university and college practices.29   But the sweep is so broad that 
one cannot rely on it for specifics – in particular, what was it like for Miss Bebb?  She 
wrote no accounts of her life: no diaries, no memoirs.  Where can we look for source 
material for women’s ‘different’ experience, where none appear to exist? 
Exploring the range of sources 
I became interested in Miss Bebb as a consequence of research I did on early women law 
students at Cambridge and Oxford.30  In the course of that research I discovered that 
there had originally been four prospective litigants against the Law Society, all Oxbridge 
law students or ex-students, and Miss Bebb was chosen (for reasons we can only 
conjecture at) to bring the test case.  I followed up all four but, where the other three 
women’s careers could be established with relative ease, Miss Bebb’s life – apart from 
that brief appearance – eluded record.  This piqued my interest. 
 The former Women’s Library in London, now re-located to the London School of 
Economics, holds the scrapbooks of two of her fellow-litigants, Nancy Nettlefold and 
Maud Ingram.31  A record not only of the celebrated case but of the entire campaign for 
women’s entry into the profession, these collections of newspaper cuttings, invitations, 
programmes and transcripts are a wonderful resource, immediate and moving.  Not all 
biographers will have access to such a scrapbook or to private papers containing such 
materials, but it must be stressed here that newspapers, both national and local (and 
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sometimes trade journals too), are among the most useful and valuable sources available 
to us.  Newspapers tell us what is news and Newspapers tell us what is news and, crucially, 
they tell us how it is presented to the public – with all the errors, misunderstandings and 
biases of which we must be conscious, as in all sources. They may offer rare 
photographic glimpses of your subject, while cartoons, editorial comments and letters to 
the editor provide critical viewpoints.  We are fortunate in this electronic age that more 
and more newspapers are being indexed and made available online. 
 But the problem with the Women’s Library scrapbooks was that they only took 
Miss Bebb’s story up to 1920, when women were admitted to the legal profession.  To 
find out about the rest of her life, I sought out the birth, death and marriage certificates 
of Miss Bebb and her daughters. These are the building blocks of biography and, in the 
case of the marriage and death certificates, were to provide the essential clues to Miss 
Bebb’s fate.  But taking such sources on their own, in the absence of amplifying diaries, 
letters or reminiscences, sets up a rather individualised narrative.  Poor Miss Bebb, what 
bad luck, she died in childbirth.  A personal tragedy. 
 Of course it wasn’t just like that.  She died because of a public failing: her medical 
care was poor.  It was poor because there was no National Health Service then and, 
crucially, because maternal health was not a government priority.  It was poor because, 
even though the condition she died from was known and doctors might have been able 
to save her, she chose to have her baby in a nursing home (as middle-class women did) 
rather than a public hospital.  I found statistics in Jane Lewis’s still unsurpassed account 
of women in England at this period32 comparing the maternal mortality rate in middle-
class Chelsea and working-class Hackney; the survival rate was better in Hackney, 
precisely because public hospitals were staffed by honorary consultants who knew what 
they were doing; and I used these to extrapolate that the risk for middle-class women in 
childbirth, unlikely as it might seem, was actually higher than for their working-class 
sisters at this time.  Thus Miss Bebb is not just one unlucky individual but, in this 
situation, one of many people against whom the scales were weighted in terms of both 
gender and class.  
 I use this example to illustrate the technique I used for filling out the bare details 
of Miss Bebb’s life.  With no personal records to turn to, I fell back on context.  This is 
where asking the right questions intersects with finding useful sources.  Throughout my 
account, I kept asking myself: What would it have been like for her?  You can never really 
get inside your subject, and I certainly never felt that Gwyneth Bebb and I had much in 
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common beyond our gender and our feminism.  But I could still try to reconstruct her 
life in the context of the society in which she moved. 
Extrapolation and conjecture 
Many years ago I wrote a chapter in a book on lesbian history entitled ‘By Their Friends 
We Shall Know Them’.33  Lesbian history was in its infancy then, a product of second-
wave feminists’ call for sexuality to be freely chosen (the seventh demand of the 
Women’s Liberation Movement) and its insistence that sexuality was socially 
constructed, not inborn.  Lesbian feminists recognised that patriarchal societies were 
sustained by what Adrienne Rich termed Compulsory Heterosexuality34 which included, 
alongside the categorisation of homosexuality as deviant and perverted, the suppression 
of all knowledge of same-sex relationships and non-heterosexual lifestyles in the past.   
My chapter was a study of women’s friendship networks in Lambeth, where I lived at the 
time, intended to demonstrate that if you could identify some lesbians in history and 
then studied who they socialised with (these were all women in public life so there were 
plenty of sources for their lives), you could formulate a pretty good idea of which other 
women were lesbians at the time, in the absence of other evidence.  If one woman lived 
with another, but had previously lived with a different woman who now lived with … 
that sort of thing.  I was not concerned to ‘prove’ anything, rather to suggest possibilities 
excluded in past accounts.   
I used the same technique for Miss Bebb.  If I couldn’t find out anything first-hand 
about her, I would investigate her associates; and they might cast light on her own 
circumstances.  I could extrapolate from what they said about the context in which she 
moved, to conjecture what her own experience might have been. 
 For her schooldays there was nothing; the school no longer exists.  But an Oxford 
women’s college at that time is a goldmine, because the colleges all have extensive 
archives.  Not only that, but the women’s colleges, like the men’s, were populated by 
outstanding women, many of whom became prominent in public life and wrote 
memoirs or had biographies written about them.  It was not difficult to find half a dozen 
accounts of life at the Oxbridge women’s colleges in this period (there was also an 
institutional history of St Hugh’s itself, which did not mention Miss Bebb) and I used 
these to try to reconstruct atmosphere, customs and rituals.  For her law studies, which 
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were shared with the men students, there were biographies of legal scholars to draw on 
(Holland, Dicey, Geldart, Vinogradoff and, especially, Holdsworth), as later there were 
biographies of the judges in the Bebb case and the leading politicians in Parliament (such 
as Lord Buckmaster and Lord Robert Cecil) who endorsed or opposed the various 
reforming Bills. The Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, with its helpful bibliographies, 
was a constant resource, for one entry led often to another.  For instance, I discovered 
that Violet Markham, with whom Miss Bebb worked in the National Service for Women 
during the war, was a close friend of Jack Hills,35 the solicitor MP who introduced the 
1913 Bill to open the solicitors’ profession to women in the wake of the failed court case.  
Another connexion was Sybil Campbell, later to become the first woman professional 
magistrate,36 who worked with Miss Bebb at both the Board of Trade and the Ministry of 
Food and became godmother to her daughter Diana. 
 I am sure that these connexions are not accidental.  Nor was it accidental that 
Miss Bebb went to work after finishing at Oxford with Clara Collet at the Board of Trade.  
It was not just that her legal talents would have been useful for the work; I feel sure that 
Miss Bebb must have known Miss Collet, because Miss Collet had studied law herself (at 
University College) and was a friend of one of the first women law students at 
Cambridge, who had been at school with her.  The feminist world was a small one; 
probably everyone knew, or knew of, everyone else.  This is important because advances 
for women are so often presented as the result of individual effort or, worse, concessions 
from above with no feminist input whatsoever. 
 In attempting to reconstruct Miss Bebb’s experiences as a student at an Oxford 
women’s college I drew on another type of source often overlooked by historians: fiction.  
‘College novels’ form a distinct literary sub-genre for both adults and young people, and 
those written for girls were at their most fashionable in the very years that Miss Bebb 
was at university.  Elsewhere I have argued37 that, while of course one must treat fiction 
as critically as any other source, the fact that it is ‘not true’ does not mean it can’t be of 
assistance to the historian in capturing aspects such as shared assumptions, customs and 
the atmosphere of the time and place.  The background for girls’ college novels was in 
any case always carefully researched by professional writers like L.T. Meade (the most 
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popular writers for girls of the period), or, in other cases, drawn from the writer’s own 
experience of college life.38 
 Be imaginative, then; look around the subject; immerse yourself in the culture 
and society of your period.  Legal scholarship is too prone to cut itself off from the 
historical roots of our contemporary situation by confining itself to formal, abstract, 
stylised, dehumanised even, conventional legal sources.  As law and literature scholars 
have long argued, literature can shed light on law since both are products of the same 
society and both are sources for its history. 
Seeing the bigger picture 
Sir John Baker, doyen of English legal historians, has written: ‘The historian, like the 
lawyer, has to find something above and beyond the sources – a story, a changing 
institution, or an evolving idea’.  He goes on: 
We must have stored in the backs of our minds numerous questions arising from 
our own reading of the secondary literature, from our knowledge of what went 
on in other periods and places, and above all from the sources themselves.  As we 
uncover more evidence, and try to sift out what is useful, we are simultaneously 
relating it to our older questions and formulating new ones, until now and again 
we see enough light to propose some answers.  We never produce final answers, 
but we help to take the general understanding forward.39 
 
This is true too for the biographer.  However difficult and time-consuming the process of 
uncovering sources to piece together a life (and there is no denying that non-historians 
frequently underestimate and undervalue the effort involved in simply doing this), the 
end result is of little use unless the life is ascribed a significance.  That is not to say that 
only the great figures of public life deserve to be recorded for posterity, as used to be 
received wisdom; ordinary people, people in the private sphere, people whose lives never 
came to anything much (all of which might be said of Miss Bebb) may still tell us 
something over and above the details of their own existence.  Indeed, with some public 
figures whose biographies have been told the significance lies not so much in how they 
carried out their public role as in how they got there in the first place.  What did it take 
for X to reach the bench, or Y to become the first whatever it was?  Sometimes the story 
is one, not of merit and personal achievement, but of political intrigue, family 
connexions, or choices based on compromise.  This is, regrettably, particularly true of 
many who have risen to positions of judicial or legislative power in this country. 
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 When she came to edit The Macmillan Dictionary of Women’s Biography (1982), Jenny 
Uglow (distinguished biographer of women) noted how difficult it was to select 
candidates, given that public achievement was the usual criterion for inclusion in a 
volume of this sort, when women had been so excluded and marginalised from public 
life.  Obviously, some women had made their mark, and they were the people of whom 
biographies had been written or whom one might find in a standard history or reference 
work. They had to go in, but others were chosen because, although often omitted from 
those very histories, they had advanced women’s position, so often considered irrelevant 
in mainstream accounts.  Uglow also decided to include two other categories of woman, 
those who embodied stereotypes (such as witches and film stars) and those who had 
become legends, for whatever reason.  She recognised that in putting together this 
motley bunch she was not ‘presenting a book which was representative of women’s 
achievements’ but ‘compiling a book of deviants’.40   
But even women in public life have private lives too, and those of us who seek to 
write more extended studies than the entries in a reference book do not have to focus on 
the one to the exclusion of the other.  One of the things I appreciated about the recent 
biography of pioneer woman judge Rose Heilbron by her daughter was the space devoted 
to the subject’s private life, particularly insightful when produced, as here, by a close 
family member.41  Indeed, when writing about professional women in an era when 
women were constructed as responsible for domestic matters, one cannot really ignore 
the effect of this ideology on, on the one hand, their personal strategies for negotiating 
the two portfolios and, on the other, the opposition they faced from traditionalists who 
would exclude them from the public sphere altogether.  From Miss Bebb to Rose 
Heilbron to today’s aspiring young women lawyers, the struggle is the same, and this 
makes women’s legal biography very much a dialogue between past and present. 
Creating heroines 
Uglow described two motivations for researching women.  The first, given women’s 
exclusion or marginalisation from historical accounts, is the need purely for information 
(‘who were the women involved, where did they qualify, what did they go on to do’).  
The second, quite different, was ‘a request for heroines’.42  Women, she explained, did 
not always want to see themselves portrayed as ‘passive victims’; heroines were 
especially important for young people, lest they grow up believing, as some of us were 
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educated to believe, that only men had achieved – or could achieve – anything in public 
life.   
 Law, of course, is notorious for constructing women as passive victims (except 
where it wants to suggest they ‘asked for it’), so we cannot be surprised when our 
students are affected by this bias.  But the truth is that we have precious few legal 
heroines out there, and our students need to understand that this is largely because 
women have been victims – not always passive ones – of a system of patriarchal power 
massively stacked against us, not simply in terms of what we achieved (or not), but also 
in terms of how our achievements have been recorded (or not).43  When I write my 
historical work I always have my students in mind – students for whom, as I realised 
recently when writing about the 1970s, I may as well have lived in the Victorian age, so 
distant seem the events and concerns of my own youthful feminism.  For them it is often 
just ‘back then’ when women were unequal, the unspoken assumption being that we are 
equal now – so if women fail to achieve in this day and age it must be due to lack of merit 
or ambition or, employing that fashionable liberal notion, choice.44 
Making someone into a heroine for posterity’s sake carries a burden of 
responsibility.  In the course of one’s research one may well find what one perceives as 
flaws, contradictions, wrong decisions or inappropriate behaviour – our subjects are 
human, after all, and we all make mistakes – and we cannot edit these out, even as we 
attempt to account for them.  Biographers must not falsify the account to fit a pre-
conceived model of hero status, not just because we are not arbiters of correct feminist 
behaviour, but because we are not competent to judge what might have been the best 
course of action in circumstances we can only imagine.  We may not feel particularly 
close to our subject; as I have said, I did not particularly identify with Miss Bebb.  It is 
perhaps more difficult to be impartial when we do.  When Barbara Babcock, herself a 
feminist pioneer (first woman appointed to the regular faculty at Stanford Law School, 
first woman director of the Public Defender Service in Washington, DC), tackled her 
biography of the woman who inspired the public defender service, Clara Foltz,45 she had 
to steer a course at once sympathetic and critical through a tale of mistaken decisions 
and erratic changes of direction.  The book’s achievement is that we nevertheless end up 
feeling inspired by Foltz’s resourcefulness, energy, optimism and humanity. 
Cornelia Sorabji, the first woman law student at Oxford and distinguished Anglo-
Indian barrister, presents her biographer with a similar range of contradictions: was she 
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or was she not a feminist?  Whose cause did she serve?46  Sorabji chose not to align 
herself with the British women’s movement or Indian nationalism, yet she worked all 
her life for women and strove to break down the barriers to women in the legal 
profession.  Who knows what routes she would have taken had she not been faced with 
the need to fit in, to be accepted and unthreatening in a racist, misogynistic society, 
simply to be able to accomplish the work she had been trained to do?  Sorabji’s life 
incidentally raises other challenges for the biographer.  There is no shortage of primary 
source material, as she wrote voluminously.  But her fascinating autobiography India 
Calling (1934)47 is, as scholars have discovered, fanciful and unreliable to the point of 
fictitious.48  Lawyers, while accustomed to weighing legal testimony, tend to abandon 
their critical sense outside the legal forum, taking for granted the idea that a published 
life is more or less ‘true’.  But truth is relative (this is the reverse point of my remarks 
about college fiction above), and there is a long tradition of fictionalised female 
autobiography encompassing, for example, writers as distinguished as Gertrude Stein49 
and Ann Oakley.50  Again, we need to understand the motives for this, which may well 
lie (inter alia) in the hostile environments in which women are forced to operate. 
Countering the myth of continuous progress 
One of the most persistent myths I sought to attack in the Bebb article was the myth of 
continuous progress.  It is true enough that things are generally better for women now 
than they were in Miss Bebb’s time, but it has certainly not been a steady uphill climb 
nor, crucially, an inevitable one, and things are not perfect yet.  Institutional histories, 
especially legal ones, tend to set down a record in which the time is right for reform, 
attitudes have changed, those in power are benevolent.  What gets left out is the steady, 
decades-long campaigns conducted by feminists (that dreadful word), female and male.  
And what also gets left out is the steady, decades-long resistance of the ruling group of 
legal men, supported no doubt by many women, reluctant to share their power.   
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Consider how the entry of women into the legal profession, if mentioned at all, is 
dealt with in the standard texts. Here is Manchester in his standard text, Modern Legal 
History (1980): 
After the First World War, and the dramatically changed role which women 
played during the course of that conflict, society began to take a radically 
different view of women’s proper role in society.  In 1919 the Law Society 
resolved that women might be admitted to the profession.51 
 
If I had a penny for every time women’s legal advances were ascribed to changed social 
attitudes I would be a rich woman today.  Yes, I always want to say when confronted 
with such accounts, attitudes changed – but why? Because the men suddenly decided it 
would be a good idea to let women in?  Or might it be because women fought a long, 
arduous battle to convince them? You would think that the achievement of the vote and 
entry into the legal profession would somehow be linked in people’s minds to the 50 
years of first-wave feminist campaigns for precisely these goals.  You would imagine that 
the advances in gender equality that took place in the 1970s, 80s and 90s might be due, 
perhaps, to the second-wave feminist campaigns for equal pay, against discrimination at 
work, against domestic violence and so on.  But no.  Law is offered to students as a series 
of top-down reforms responding to, at best, individual challenges like that of Miss Bebb; 
at worst, those unmotivated shifts in public opinion. 
Cutting each generation off from its history is the most effective means of 
disempowering them: believing that equality has been achieved, young women are 
destabilised when they encounter persistent discrimination; every battle has to be re-
fought; every wheel re-invented.  Here again what happened in Miss Bebb’s lifetime has 
been replayed over different issues in my own.  This is, then, the final question that 
biographers must ask of their sources: why did all this happen in the way it did?  Who 
was responsible, and who stood in the way, and, again, why? 
Conclusion 
When the Dictionary of National Biography was being revised in the last years of the 
twentieth century, a welcome decision was made to include many more women and 
representatives of minority interests beyond the great white men of the nineteenth-
century volumes.  When it became clear that the editors were interested not simply in 
those who had succeeded in public life, but also in those through whose efforts 
important social changes were progressed, I was emboldened to write and suggest that 
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Miss Bebb might be suitable for inclusion.  The editors accepted my suggestion and 
invited me to write the entry. 
 This was a woman whose contribution to the legal profession had been ignored or 
dismissed by the institutional histories because it was deemed unimportant and whose 
contribution to feminism had been overlooked and forgotten because her early death 
robbed her of the chance to be England’s first woman barrister.  This was a woman who 
left no records, not even a will; whose ‘voice’ is only preserved in the transcript of the 
Bebb trial in the Chancery Division and in extracts from speeches in newspaper accounts 
(all formal settings); and whose life had to be painstakingly reconstructed from a few 
public records, a great deal of extrapolation and some shameless conjecture.  But, given 
that the ODNB is often scholars’ first port of call if they want to find out about an 
individual, my account of Gwyneth Bebb’s life has become an important resource for 
future researchers.  More than that, I am proud to have created, in the sense I have 
described, a heroine, someone for future legal campaigners to find, admire, perhaps; 
even to emulate, in the face of women’s continued struggles for justice and equality.   
